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We present an one-time-pad key communication protocol that allows secure direct communica-
tion with entanglement. Alice can send message to Bob in a deterministic manner by using local
measurements and public communication. The theoretical efficiency of this protocol is double com-
pared with BB84 protocol. We show this protocol is unconditional secure under arbitrary quantum
attack. And we discuss that this protocol can be perfectly implemented with current technologies.
It has been showed that quantum mechanics can be used to implement quantum key distribution (QKD) [1,2].
However, this QKD idea does not exploit the full potential of quantum mechanics. Instead of creating a secret key,
quantum mechanics can be used to send a secret message directly from Alice to Bob [3,4,5]. But the implement of the
protocol in Ref. [3] required the use of a more than two dimensional Hilbert space on the single photon. In Ref.[4],
a ping-pong protocol has been presented which allows secure QKD and quasisecure direct communication. However,
this ping-pong protocol is not secure under the measurement attack [6]. In this paper, we introduce an one-time-pad
key protocol that is an successful implementation for secure direct communication using only local measurements and
classical communication with Einstein-Podosky-Rosen(EPR) pair.
As is well known that two qubits can be entangled in one of the Bell states
|φ+ >AB= 1√
2
(|0 >A |0 >B +|1 >A |1 >B) = 1√
2
(|+ >A |+ >B +|− >A |− >B), (1)
|φ− >AB= 1√
2
(|0 >A |0 >B −|1 >A |1 >B) = 1√
2
(|+ >A |− >B +|− >A |+ >B), (2)
|ψ+ >AB= 1√
2
(|0 >A |1 >B +|1 >A |0 >B) = 1√
2
(|+ >A |+ >B −|− >A |− >B), (3)
|ψ− >AB= 1√
2
(|0 >A |1 >B −|1 >A |0 >B) = 1√
2
(|− >A |+ >B −|+ >A |− >B), (4)
where |0 > and |1 > are up and down eigenstate of the σz , and |+ >= 1√
2
(|0 > +|1 >), |− >= 1√
2
(|0 > −|1 >).
It is well known that such states can be used to establish nonlocal correlations over a spacelike interval, but these
correlations cannot be used for superluminal communication [7]. Suppose Bob has an EPR pair in the single state
|ψ− >. He sends one qubit, say A, to Alice and keeps another. Alice performs a local measurement on the qubit A in
the basis BZ = {|0 >, |1 >}. Thus this single state will collapse immediately to a product state and the entanglement
does not exist any longer. Bob also performs a local measurement in the basis Bz. If Alice’s measurement outcome
is |0 > (|1 >), then she knows that Bob’s measurement outcome is certain to |1 > (|0 >). But what outcome Alice
obtains is random with a probability p = 0.5 for ρA := trB{|ψ− >< ψ−|} = 12 |0 >< 0|+ 12 |1 >< 1|. To successfully
transmit message from Alice to Bob, a reliable public channel is required. After Alice received the travel qubit, she
performs a measurement on this qubit in the basis Bz. Afterwards she sends a signal (one classical bit) based on her
measurement outcome to Bob through public channel. Bob also performs a measurement in basis Bz after he received
Alice’s signal. Assume Alice’s measurement outcome is |0 >, i.e. she knows that Bob’s succedent measurement
outcome is |1 >. When she want to sends a logical ‘0’ to Bob, she ‘say no’ to Bob through public channel. Else, Alice
‘say yes’ to Bob to encode a logical ‘1’. If Alice’s measurement is |1 >, she can also encode the logical ‘0’ and ‘1’
using the method described above. Therefore, Alice can sends her secret message to Bob in the way described above.
By default, Alice and Bob are in message mode and communicate the way described above. With probability c, Alice
switches to control mode. Control mode. After received the travel qubit, Alice performs a measurement randomly
in the basis Bz or Bx = {|+ >, |− >}. Using public channel, she sends the result to Bob. Then Bob also switches
to control mode. He performs a measurement in the same basis as Bob used. Bob compares both of the results. If
both results coincide, Bob knows that there is an Eavesdropper-Eve in line and stops the communication. Else, this
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communication continues. This protocol can be described explicitly like this: (1) Bob prepares two qubits in the Bell
state |ψ− >. (2) Bob sends one qubit to Bob and keeps another. (3) Alice receives the travel qubit. With probability
c, she switches to the control mode (4c). Else, she performs message mode (4m). (4c) Alice performs a measurement
on her qubit randomly in the basis Bx or Bz and tells the result to Bob through public channel. Bob then performs
a measurement in the same basis Alice used. If he finds both results coincide, then he stops the communication. Else
this communication continues. (4m) Bob performs a measurement in the basis Bz. Then she sends her signal to Bob
through public channel. Bob also performs a measurement in the basis Bz . When Alice want to transmit a logical
‘0’ to Bob, if her measurement outcome is |1 >, she ‘say yes’ to Bob through public channel. Else, she ‘say no’ to
Bob. When Alice want to transmit a logical ‘1’ to Bob, she ‘say yes’ to Bob with her measurement outcome |0 >.
Else she ‘say no’ to Bob with her measurement outcome |1 >.(5) When all of Alice’s information is transmitted, this
communication is successfully terminated.
Security proof . From Eq.(1)-Eq.(4), we know that when Alice and Bob share the state |φ+ >, both of Alice’s
and Bob’s results will coincide no matter which basis they use in control mode. When Alice and Bob share the state
|φ− >, their measurement outcome will coincide when they use the measurement basis Bz . Alice and Bob will obtain
the same outcome with the measurement basis Bx when they share the state |ψ+ >. If and only if they share the
state |ψ− >, their measurement outcome will never coincide. Since Alice selects the measurement basis randomly
in control mode, the detection probability is at least d ≥ 0.5 when the state they shared is one of {|φ± >, |ψ− >}.
In order to be practical and secure, a QKD scheme must be based on existing-or nearly existing-technology, but
its security must be guaranteed against an eavesdropper whose technology is limited only by the laws of quantum
mechanics [8]. In this protocol, Eve’s aim is to find out what Bob’s measurement outcome is. Eve has no access to
Alice’s qubit. All that she can do is to attack Bob’s qubit in the quantum channel. For Eve, the qubit Bob sends
to Alice is in a complete mixed state which is completely indistinguishable without measurement. Eve can use all
technique allowed by quantum laws to attack the travel qubit. The most general attack operation ε can be described
as a completely positive map [9], which implies that it is possible to find out an ancilla, E, initially in a pure state
|e >< e| uncorrelated with the system, and a unitary operator U , obtaining
ρ = ε(|ψ− >< ψ−|) = trE{U |ψ− >< ψ−| ⊗ |e >< e|U †}. (5)
After Eve’s attack, the fidelity [10] of the states |ψ− > and ρ is
F (|ψ− >, ρ) = tr
√
< ψ−|ρ|ψ− > |ψ− >< ψ−| =
√
< ψ−|ρ|ψ− >. (6)
Let us assume that
F (|ψ− >, ρ)2 = 1− γ, (7)
where 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1. Because of the completeness of the Bell’s states, it has that the detection probability d is
approximately dependent on the quantity γ, d ≥ γ/2. Let us consider that information Eve can gain when the fidelity
of the state |ψ− > and ρ is √1− γ. The mutual information Eve can gain from ρ is bounded by Holevo quantity,
χ(ρ) [9]. From
χ(ρ) = S(ρ)−
∑
i
piS(ρi), (8)
we know that S(ρ) is the upper bound of the information Eve can gain from ρ. Nevertheless, the entropy of ρ is
bounded above by the entropy of a diagonal density matrix ρmax with diagonal entries 1 − γ, γ3 , γ3 , γ3 . The entropy
of ρmax is
S(ρmax) = −(1− γ) log2(1− γ)− γ log2
γ
3
. (9)
Then the quantity S(ρmax) is the upper bound of the information Eve can gain.
Let us consider the relation between the fidelity F (|ψ− >, ρ) and the detection probability d. When γ = 0, i.e.,
S(ρmax) = 0, information Eve can gain is zero. The detection probability d is also zero in this condition. If Eve want
to gain some of Alice’s information, it has S(ρmax) > 0. When S(ρmax) reaches its maximal value S(ρmax) = 2, it has
γ = 3
4
. Since the von Neumann entropy S(ρmax) is a continuous function of γ, any information Eve gain will make
her face a nonzero risk to be detected. The more information Eve wants to gain, the bigger risk Eve has face. One bit
information obtained from ρ will make him face a risk to be detected, approximately d ≥ γ
2
≈ 9.5%. The information
I0(d) Eve can gain in every message run is approximately dependent on the detection probability d(I0).
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Practical feasibility. Experimental quantum key distribution was demonstrated for first time by Bennett et al.
[11]. Today, several groups have shown that quantum key distribution is possible, even outside the laboratory [12].
In principle, any two-level quantum system could be used to implement quantum cryptography. In practice, photons
are the optimal systems for entanglement distribution because they propagate fast and can preserve their coherence
over long distances. Recently, given impure EPR pairs shared between two distant communicators, physical scientists
can apply local operations and classical communication to distill a smaller number of higher fidelity EPR pairs in a
procedure known as entanglement purification [13,14].
In the proposal for long-distance quantum communication [15], entanglement between atomic ensembles is estab-
lished by the detection of a single photon that could have been emitted by either ensemble. In Ref.[16], Simon and
Irvine proposed a scheme where distance trapped ions are entangled by the joint detection of two photons, one coming
from each ion. Actually, only by using a beam splitter and two photon detectors, two ions can be probabilistically
prepared in the state |ψ− > [17]. And the entangled ions can be stored perfectly in each ion trap comparing with the
photon storage. The entanglement time can be prolonged with the long-lifetime of excited state of ion [18]. Comparing
with today’s technologies, our protocol can be realized not only in principle but also in practice.
Discussion and Conclusion. Virtually, our protocol is an one-time-pad key protocol. In fact, this protocol is a
variant of the Ekert91 [2] QKD protocol. It also have been mentioned in a two-step quantum direct communication
protocol [19] that Alice and Bob can establish a common one-time-pad key. It even could be considered a variant
of the ping-pong protocol [4], obtained by replacing Bob’s final measurement by two measurements performed by
Alice and Bob on their respective qubits, followed by classical communication. However, our protocol allows secure
direct communication only using local measurement and classical communication. And it does not need a Bell-basis
measurement in our protocol [19,20].
The theoretical efficiency of a QKD protocol is defined as ε = bs/(qt + bt) [21], where, for every step, bs is the
expected number of secret bit transmitted, qt is the number of qubits exchanged on the quantum channel, and bt is
the number of the announced bits. In BB84 protocol, 0.5 bs bit transmitted needs 1 qt and 1 bt. In our protocol, 1 qt
and 1 bt can help the communicator to exchange 1 secret bit. Thus, our protocol has high efficiency compared with
BB84 protocol. Moreover, in this protocol, the control parameter c is determined by the communicators. It can be
modulated according to the variant quantum channel.
In summary, we propose an one-time-pad key communication protocol with entanglement, which allows secure
direct communication by using local measurements and classical communication. This direct communication between
Alice and Bob is more efficient compared to Ekert protocol and BB84 protocol. And this protocol can be perfectly
implemented with current technologies.
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